Most analysts agree that Iran’s regional influence has significantly declined in the aftermath of Israel’s fierce response to the October 7 attack. In the course of that response, Iran has lost its historic and traditional Arab ally–Bashar al-Assad’s Syria – to the very adversary it spent years fighting on Syrian soil to defend that regime against: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Sunni jihadist party headed by now-President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Iran’s most loyal and effective regional partner, Hezbollah, suffered a military defeat at the hands of Israel and now faces the real prospect of being forced to disarm. Meanwhile, the Houthis–Tehran’s loudest yet least strategically consequential ally – continue to suffer painful Israeli strikes.
Only in Iraq does Iran’s influence appear undiminished. The Islamic Republic’s allies there – both armed factions and political groups, foremost among them the ruling Coordination Framework, which brings together most of the country’s pro-Iranian forces – still maintain a firm grip on power. Their support for Tehran and defense of its interests at Iraq’s expense also remain unchanged. During the 12-day war on Iran in June, they carefully avoided any political or military escalation against U.S. forces in Iraq or any attacks against Israel. This behavior is often framed as factional pragmatism, or even as a form of loyalty to the nation. The more plausible explanation is rarely acknowledged: there is little these groups could have done to affect the situation without exposing themselves to severe consequences.
There is a growing Iraqi desire, expressed through both official and popular channels, to dismantle the armed factions – whether inside or outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The most significant official manifestation of this desire came in the form of unimplemented government decrees during the tenures of Haider al-Abadi and Adel Abdul Mahdi to institutionalize the PMF by stripping it of factional, political, and party affiliations and transforming it into a professional military force. The United States supported those decisions at the time but did nothing to push the Iraqi government to enforce them or help it overcome the pressures that ultimately derailed that effort.
The first real test of whether Iran’s influence in Iraq can maintain its traditional strength will come in the wake of Iraq’s parliamentary elections. Since 2010, Iran has played an increasingly decisive role in shaping the post-election political coalitions that determine the prime minister and his cabinet. In doing so, it has benefited from two interlinked realities.
The first is a political arrangement that undermines the concept of a single electoral winner. In contrast to many parliamentary democracies, where elections produce a clear victor who automatically gets the chance to form a government, Iraq’s elections yield multiple “winners” – parties that then compete to form the largest parliamentary bloc authorized to choose the prime minister. This competition is often waged with illicit tools, such as bribery and judicial intimidation based on fabricated or real charges. Over the past two decades the outcome has consistently favored the ruling coalition.
The second reality stems from the first: deep divisions among these parties – especially Shiite Islamist ones aligned with Iran – have repeatedly allowed Tehran to mediate the final deal. That process typically involves months of shuttle visits and tense negotiations during which Iran places many of its allies in key positions and ensures that the chosen prime minister is friendly to Tehran and poses no threat to its interests. The 2010 Erbil Agreement, which produced Maliki’s second government, stands as a prime example: it resolved a dangerous deadlock, allowing the election loser, Maliki, to retain power in exchange for key Iranian gains, including Maliki’s pledge to expel all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. (They later returned, three years later, at Baghdad’s request following the fall of Mosul.)
Since that U.S.-backed decision in 2010 – when the Obama administration wrongly endorsed the Erbil deal – Washington has largely avoided using its influence to correct this structural flaw, thereby leaving the field open for Tehran to shape successive Iraqi governments.
In the coming days, once the election results are announced, Iraqi political actors will again face the same test: producing a governing deal that determines the prime minister, allocates ministries, and divides influence among “winning” groups. Iraqi factions have never achieved this independently; Iran, accepted by Shiite parties as mediator and empowered by its institutional and shadow influence in Iraq, has always been the only player capable of brokering these complex arrangements.
But now, amid Iran’s regional setbacks and growing U.S. pressure on Baghdad to distance itself from Tehran, Iraq’s dominant factions face a unique challenge: whether they can swiftly develop the political skill to form a government without the habitual recourse to Iranian mediation. If they fail and instead fall back on the old, harmful habit of summoning Iran to manage their politics at the expense of Iraq’s national interest, this will signal that Tehran’s sway remains entrenched.
Yet there is still a chance that Iraq’s political forces may forgo Iranian interference in forming a government and independently forge a new kind of grand bargain unlike those brokered by Tehran in the past.
The reason is that some factions within the Coordination Framework itself favor genuine institutionalization of the PMF and may leverage U.S. pressure to strengthen their position. Meanwhile, the Shiite religious authority in Najaf has become increasingly vocal in supporting the principle of keeping arms solely in the hands of the state, a stance that effectively translates into advocating the dismantling of armed factions.
Iraqi politicians should seize the chance to prioritize their country’s national interests – chiefly, the tangible curbing of pro-Iranian militias’ influence, which aligns with urgent U.S. demands. Failure to do so could trigger American financial and economic sanctions on Iraq for its dependence on Iran – an untenable situation for a nation considered a U.S. ally.
Iraq’s leading politicians are well aware of the gravity of this moment. Yet the critical question is whether they can transform this awareness into concrete, credible steps reflected in the formation of the next government and its priorities. The coming weeks will reveal whether Iraq’s leaders choose the familiar, destructive path or adopt a new approach that distances their country from Tehran’s grip.
Such a shift would require moral courage and political boldness – qualities rarely seen among Iraq’s ruling class. If they fail, the cost will likely be severe – both for them and for the country they govern.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Akeel Abbas
Akeel Abbas, a nonresident senior fellow at the Iraq Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focuses on national and religious identities, modernity, and democratization in the Middle East.
